August 27 Syria Crisis SITREP

When I first heard about the chemical attack in Damascus, Syria and the call for a US response the day after, my thought was that a week would be required to set up a response, both diplomatically and militarily. Theoretically, any nation within range could ACTUALLY respond within 12-24 hours, such a response would possess only emotion gratification, and lack any true diplomatic or strategic depth. Even so, even a week isn't enough to acquire true strategic depth, even for the US ...but at least a limited depth, and therefore a limited victory, is possible.

If the one week rule is true, then the earliest a strike could occur is August 28-30 (Wed – Fri).

Current observations of the news indicate that Thursday is doomsday for a US strike. The rebels are hunkering down; the Syrians are dispersing; the new CENTCOM base in Jordan went active and a big meeting was held last weekend; the Russians activated their forces in the Caucasus and Asia, and various militaries are maneuvering.

USA:

The US has an acceptable position for attack by the deadline ...not overwhelming, but winnable.

Here's a list of known (or speculated) available forces:

USS Harry S. Truman CSG (Lead Carrier)

BATTLEGROUP: 1-CG; 4-DDG

LOCATION: Red Sea / Gulf of Aden

USS Nimitz CSG (Follow-on / Iranian Contingency Carrier)

BATTLEGROUP: 2-CG; 2-DDG

LOCATION: Arabian Sea & Gulf

USS Kearsarge ARG

BATTLEGROUP: 1-LHD; 1-LPD; 1-LSD; 1-MEU

LOCATION: Red Sea / Gulf of Aden

6^th Fleet Warships within meaningful range:

1-LCC; 4-DDG; 3-FFG; 1-SSN(?)

USAF / Army (ADA, Fighters & Bombers / unknown composition)

Jordan; Turkey; Italy; Israel; UAE; Germany; UK; USA

US Army / Marines fast response units

Kearsarge ARG; Italy; Djibouti; Spain; Jordan; Israel(?)

The US only has one viable CVN in this fight, the USS Truman CSG, which is currently in a good defensive position in the Red Sea far beyond Syria's ability to counter with anti-ship missiles in Lebanon or Latakia, Syria. The Nimitz is best used as a follow-on carrier with it's aircraft from the Arabian Gulf, or as a counter weight to Iran in the Arabian Sea. It's location during this time will reflect it's use and posture. The US has excellent battle-control using the CENTCOM bases in Jordan and UAE, and the US Navy's command ship USS Mt. Whitney. The USAF has good AOR coverage with bases in Italy, Jordan, Turkey, with support from the German and UK bases, stealth bombers from the US, and ABM / ADA bases in Turkey, Israel, Jordan, UAE, and US Navy ABM destroyers. Ground forces will only be a factor in special strikes, raids or operations that must be done by hand ...and I expect to hear nothing about it. This is a fighter / bomber / missile fight.

UNITED KINGDOM:

While the UK appears to be taking a lead command role with the US on this issue, and commentators have speculated on their weakness, they have missed the UK's main strength ...possibly because it's currently woefully unbalanced for the needs of the situation. Right now the Royal Navy has an enormous battlefleet in the Mediterranean. This should attract the attention of analysts, but hasn't. Why? Because it's all amphibious, with very limited strike, ADA or cruise missile attack capabilities ...and if this is a fighter / bomber / missile fight, then the Royal Navy might as well sit it out, because only the RAF will attend the show. Most commentators have also speculated that even the RAF is meaningless in this fight because Cyprus has thus-far denied them the right to use the base there but a buildup of RAF power at the base has been observed, thus eliminating the UK from the theater. However, I'd like to remind the casual observer that the RAF can forward their fighter-bombers to any Allied base that is cooperating with the USAF or NATO around the world within 24 hours or less. As such, expect them to show up in Turkey and Jordan (a huge ally of the UK). NOTE: as of 8/27 PM, the RAF has been observed building up air power at the base, but permission hasn't been granted yet. Either Cyprus will soon allow strikes, or the RAF will shift to bases in Turkey or Jordan.

FRANCE:

France is a secondary Allied superpower in this fight. They agree on attacking, but they'll only fulfill a minor position ...based on current observations. They have an ability to act equally with the US, but will they? The CVN Charles de Gaulle was last noted in homeport. Their airgroup has completed their certifications, so they can surge forward if needed, and only two days are needed for them to take a good strike position behind Cyprus. However, I have yet to hear any word that they are (as of 8/27 @ 3:00 Eastern US time), and something as big as this would be advertised. They do have 4-DDG's and 5-FFG's available for surging as well, which easily matches our surface combatants in theater, but nothing has been said yet. The only true frontline units noted are Rafale fighter-bombers in Saudi Arabia. France has the ability to move units as fast as the UK, and a better naval strike package available, but unless they're being sneaky (which doesn't sound like France) then they're a virtual no-show at this one. Personally, I think their mind is still on Operation Serval in Mali and their precarious UN army unit in Lebanon, so making a lot of noise isn't to their benefit this time.

As for the remaining superpowers...

RUSSIA:

Russia is in a bad spot in the Syrian crisis, and I really feel for them. Syria has been a long time ally and client, and an excellent flanking position opposite NATO's virtual ownership of the Mediterranean. However, Russia has been losing this one in slow motion for a couple years now, and despite all their diplomatic stalling and bluster, they know it and have been feeling around for a replacement for at least a year. It's been observed that various military units, Naval, AF and Army / ADA, within Russia (Caucasus and Asia) have been placed on alert status, and that's a prudent maneuver, but it's essentially meaningless. If they were SERIOUS about protecting Syria's sovereignty, they'd have surged the Black Sea and North Sea Fleets, and moved a couple Army ADA and AF fighter squadrons in country to check-mate the US ...but they've done nothing along those lines. Instead, all military units, including the floating repair ship have been removed, and right-this-second they're evacuating Russian nationals from Syria. I'm still thinking a special Russian Army ADA unit was stationed at Tartus and Latakia (refer back to when the Turkish AF fighter was downed), but I'll bet they've left too via the RFS Azov and Filchenkov in May. Since that time Russia has been aggressively shopping for a replacement base, and to me that's a game changer for Syria.

Still, could Russia respond in any way other than diplomatically? Ummm, not really...

The core of the Black Sea Fleets strength is halfway around the world ...the RFS Moskva Task Force docked in Venezuela on Monday. Without it, the fleet is defensive by nature, and no superior naval threat can be mustered. The Mediterranean Task Force has dwindled to a couple warships in the East Mediterranean, and without the ability to stand a credible battlegroup, they'll mostly stay out of the way. The Russian AF is a non-player, as they have no squadrons in the area, no ability to sortie out over international airspace from Russia, and no on-station refueling. Their only access is via Turkey (HAHAHA, right) or Iran / Iraq. Iran might allow it, but Iraq probably would get VERY squeamish and not play ball. So, all they can do is complain and drive their tanks in circles. And this is what's so tragic for them. They have 30,000 nationals in Syria, lots of contracts and money, strategic assets ...and no good ways of extracting or improving their position without cooperating with the US and NATO.

If someone could advise on which brand is Putin's favorite vodka, I feel compelled to send him some.

CHINA:

Other than being a diplomatic dark horse, capable of not caring or causing lots of noise, China is pretty much a non-player. Their assets in-country are minor, so there's not much to defend other then principal. They have a good handful of naval (strike and amphibious) assets within 2-3 days sailing if they wanted to fly the flag ...but why? China is friendly with Syria, but their big push is into Africa and the S. China Sea. Syria would only be a distraction ...and if Syria did use WMD's, then a moral liability too. I expect only complaining from China.

And what about Syria itself?

Their ADA is concentrated at Damascus and the important coastal cities Tartus and Latakia, but I'll bet the Russian “Advisers” have fled the country and left the systems in a less than adequate condition. Recent Israeli airstrikes were completely unchallenged, and I've even heard about Israeli commando raids out of the Golan being unchallenged as well. Their Army is weakened and is being buffered by Iranian “Advisers” and Hezbollah paramilitary units. Their supply lines between the major cities is threatened, even though they've recently recaptured the road to Homs, and thus the link to the Alawite enclave and Latakia. Most of the country is out of central control and power centers are regularly threatened. Turkey defacto controls a 20-30 mile buffer zone along their border, and has punitively shelled Syrian units for cross border indiscretions.

If they did use chemical weapons, it must have been from a position of weakness, because there is little benefit to them (other than fear) for using it. The rebels, however, have several good strategic reasons for using them ...namely, a false flag strike on civilian targets would enrage the world community, provoke a strike, and possibly topple the regime for them. They can then clean up, move in, take over and turn their attentions to achieving supremacy over the other rebel factions. A sundering of national Syria into faction-states is more possible than Iraq within 5-years without the direct intervention of a major power, and a new middle-east dynamic of unknown direction is likely.

I'm not saying the Syrian Army or rebels used the chemical weapons, but someone did, and the red line for intervention obviously wasn't simply their use, but their scale of use. This could indicate that no one is interested in intervening, but now we must do something or look bad. And if we do strike, what would we want to achieve?

Syria is a miserable mess. Nothing good is achieved by winning or losing here. If the regime is toppled, only a benefactor superpower stabilizing it's recovery can guarantee a meaningful survival ...not even the Russians are volunteering for that one, and they have the most to gain or loose here (Hello? Putin!?!).

So what would be prudent?

1. Initiate an airstike as threatened. Our moral high ground is at stake here, so we have to, and the risk is less than the media realize. BUT, only degrade Syria's ADA, WMD, strategic assets and airpower. Threatening them with continued punitive strikes is necessary, but it won't be needed.
2. Don't topple Assad ...yet. We need the factions and Army to continue fighting.
3. Strengthen the pro-west government in exile while strangling the pro-Islamist factions. The Syrian Army will happily do the dirty work in country, and the pro-West allies can handle things outside the country.
4. Establish a defacto no-fly zone over the country for protecting ourselves, and no-fighting zones at established refugee cities in-country which will be virtually under our control for intelligence purposes. This gives civilians a peaceful option to survive instead of crossing the border and humanitarian organizations open access to them, and it gives us the ability to screen and eliminate Al Qaeda elements in their resting / infiltrating phase.
5. Once a viable, stable, pro-west exile government is created, and it's benefit recognized in the refugee cities, then allow or encourage the regime to topple. Assad is totally damaged morally, so he's not able to be refurbished. The new government then stands a chance to establish itself without fragmenting the country or allowing Al Qaeda open access. There is still the possibility of the Kurdish zones trying to break away, but I'm sure we can incentivize their cooperation.