Ukraine SITREP (Mar 2)

Ukraine SITREP (Feb 28 – Mar 2)

 

Army Analysis:

Currently downsizing Army to 240,000 by 2015

Army is currently reforming and modernizing, reorganized into a brigade structure instead of divisional structure.

 

COMPOSITION:

3-Corps (West, North, South)

2-Armored Brigades
1-Airborne Brigade
2-Airmobile Brigade
8-Mechanized Brigades
3-Artillery Brigade
2-Army Aviation

57,000-troops

686-tanks                            (most common = T-64 and T-72 variants)
2,065-APC’s                        (most common = MT-LB, BMP-2, BMP-1 variants)
716-Artillery                       (most common = 2S1, 2S3, D-30 mobile gun, and BM-21 Grad Rocket)
91-Combat Helo               (most common = Mi-24, Mi-8)
Anti-Aircraft                       (unknown number = S-300, Tor, ZSU-23 Shilka, etc…)

 

 

Southern Corp will be most affected. No major units stationed in Crimea.

Units are intact and functional if they can resist attempts to defect to pro-Russia camp. Would be first major responders to any armed resistance to Russian incursion.

6^th Army Corps, HQ

17^th Tank Brigade

25^th Airborne Brigade

28^th Guards Mech Brigade

92^nd Guards Mech Brigade

93^rd Guards Mech Brigade

55^th Artillery Brigade

 

Estimate 1/3^rd of Northern units (if intact) can assist Southern Corp vs. Russia. Must reserve enough to resist any efforts to strike Kiev or resist Belorussian incursion.

 

Estimate 2/3 of Western units can respond (if intact). Border with Poland and Romania is safe from incursion. Interior troops are sufficient.

 

Southern Corp needs to filter itself out, regroup and mobilize with loyal troops. Tank Brigade and 3-Mech need to mobilize to Crimean border, establish defenses and prep for incursion. Placement of artillery and rocket units critical to managing Russian entrenchments at border. All Airborne and Air mobile units need to prep for deep incursion into Crimea to re-capture border crossing with Russia, airports and Sevestopol. Cut off Russian reinforcements and eliminate the Black Sea Base from supporting naval operations and reinforcements from Russia. Sevestopol base is the whole issue. If it’s not possible to recapture Crimea and regain lost territory, then burn Sevestopol Base to remove its usefulness to Russia.

 

NAVY:

Ukrainian naval forces are weak and behind Russian lines (they also share the Sevestopol base).

 

AIR FORCE:

Ukrainian AF is weak, unable to achieve air supremacy vs. Russia. Recommend linking fighters to ground attack ops. Don’t stage fighter combat ops over Crimea. Instead, protect ground attack fighters and ground troops from Russian AF. Use aggressive anti-air ground systems to rob supremacy from Russia, and project that defense over as much of Crimea as possible from mainland Ukraine. Also suggest engaging from behind lines, then luring Russian fighters into AAD trap.

 

Ukrainian Response Phases:

• Currently Mobilizing reserves for weaponizing and deployment
• Currently filtering out and regrouping army brigades
• No serious reinforcement of border with Crimea or Russia undertaken yet
• Estimate 1-month to stand up effective active army units and secure borders
• Estimate 2-months to establish air denial vs. Russian AF
• Estimate 3-6 months to reach enough momentum to recapture Crimea

 

CONS:

• Estimate 1-month is too long, Russia will be able to mobilize 1-3 divisions to reinforce current 1-division in Crimea.
• Estimate 2-months Russia capable of mobilizing 3-5 divisions on eastern border with Ukraine threatening to flank South Corp and seize eastern Ukraine.
• Estimate 1-week Russia capable of forwarding enough AF assets to achieve local air supremacy over Crimea and eastern Ukraine if needed. This may have already occurred.
• Estimate Russian Navy has currently achieved naval dominance, and capable of blockading all of Ukraine and projecting firepower inland via AAD and striking ground targets. This forces weakness is Seves